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INTRODUCTION
According to the Surgeon General’s
Report on Smoking “[s]moking remains
the largest single preventable cause of pre-
mature death and disability in the United
States” [1]. Statistics from the Center for
Disease Control cite that “[s]moking
begins primarily during childhood and
adolescence” [2] and that, “[n]early all
first use of tobacco occurs before high
school graduation; this finding suggests
that if adolescents can be kept tobacco-
free, most will never start using tobacco”
[2]. Therefore, tobacco control policies
directed at the youth population could pro-
vide an effective method for accomplish-
ing and sustaining long-term reductions in
smoking in all segments of the population.
Policy makers seeking to decrease youth
smoking have attempted various types of
restrictive laws, public campaigns, and
taxation duties; and there has been dis-
agreement over which is most effective.
We seek to investigate the efficacy of var-
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Tobacco-related mortality is one of the biggest killers in American medicine. Evidence sug-
gests that if adolescents can be kept tobacco-free, most will never start using tobacco.
Therefore, tobacco control policies directed at the youth population could provide an effec-
tive method for sustaining long-term reductions in smoking in all segments of the popula-
tion. Many forms of tobacco control policies have been implemented including restrictive
laws, public campaigns, and taxation duties; there has been disagreement over which is
most effective. We investigate the efficacy of various methods of tobacco control in youth
and present a review of the published evidence.
Econometric data for both youth access restrictions and environmental tobacco smoke
restrictions afford ambiguous results. Results vary in a continuum from a moderate nega-
tive effect toward, ironically, a marginal positive effect on smoking. While information dis-
semination policies may be somewhat effective on the onset, they are limited in their effect
and eventually diminish over time. We conclude that increases in price affect teen smok-
ing to a great degree. Most estimates show that for a 10 percent increase in prices, which
could be implemented by a tax per pack, a 15 percent decrease in cigarettes consumed
could be accomplished. Taxation policies are an effective means of preventative medicine.ious methods of tobacco control in youth
and present a review of the published evi-
dence thereto.
RESTRICTIVE POLICIES
Restrictive policies serve a paternalis-
tic government function, outlaw undesir-
able social behavior, and punish those who
disobey. Such laws pose costs to those
who choose to continue such criminal
actions in the order of fines or loss of free-
dom (prison) and presumably make the
desirability of such behavior unworthy of
its costs. This set of policies can be further
categorized as access controls and envi-
ronmental controls.
The evidence for the effectiveness of
access controls to obtaining tobacco prod-
ucts has been lukewarm at best. Access
controls describe policies intended to keep
cigarettes out of the hands of adolescents
and aim to make it more difficult to pos-
sess. These policies include restrictions in
purchasing, requiring signs on vendors’
windows advertising such restrictions,
mandates of identification inspection, and
the explicit licensing of tobacco sales
much in the same way as alcohol sales.
Other such policies include certain prohi-
bitions on cigarette vending machines and
bans on providing free samples.
The literature provides little evidence
that these policies are effective; what has
been published is a mixed bag of results.
Gruber [3] discovers that among high
school seniors, access control policies
show minimal effects on the participation
and frequency rate of smoking. For the
younger students in the same study, access
controls seem to provide a marginally
more significant negative impact on smok-
ing quantity but not on participation rate.
Emery et al. [4] find that tobacco access
controls are more effective for adolescents
experimenting with smoking and that such
policies become nearly insignificant as
smoking becomes more habitual. Lewitt et
al. [5] show that among ninth-graders, age
restrictions have neither an effect on a
reduction in quantity or frequency smoked
nor an effect on those considering smok-
ing. Yet, these restrictions do, however,
have a negative effect on participation
rates to the extent of 4 percent to 5 percent.
The results that Chaloupka and Grossman
[6] report appear counterintuitive.
Contrary to the intent of access control
policies, the duo find that a minimum age
restriction provides a statistically signifi-
cant value supporting the notion that these
laws lead to increased smoking. This
could perhaps be attributed to a “forbidden
fruit” effect, whereby outlawing a good
makes it more desirable. However, the
authors attribute this statistic to the lack-
adaisical manner in which compliance is
enforced. They speculate that such laws
would at the very least impact youth
smoking somewhat negatively if properly
enforced.
In investigating the effects of the
other access restriction policies, studies
show more consistent evidence of ineffec-
tiveness. Chaloupka and Grossman [6]
find that since most youth do not obtain
their cigarettes from vending machines,
there is little evidence of vending restric-
tions decreasing smoking; Lewitt et al. [5]
find the same result. With regard to laws
prohibiting free samples, the same two
studies again show insignificant proof of
such a policy deterring youth smoking.
Most are now familiar with the dele-
terious effects of secondhand smoke; as
such, ordinances have been enacted to
limit citizens’ environmental tobacco
smoke exposure. These types of bans on
smoking in many places, including
schools, hospitals, retail areas, public
institutions, workplaces, and restaurants,
make it more difficult for the smoker to
smoke at will. It can be speculated that by
preventing most smoking in socially inter-
active settings, the social value of smoking
decreases. This consideration to the youth
population might suggest that peer pres-
sure to smoking could potentially be miti-
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certain locations are sanctioned, such as in
the school or in nearby vicinities, the prob-
ability of groups of students gathering to
smoke diminishes. Students will be less
exposed to the act of smoking and the
pressures to follow in the actions of their
friends.
The evidence for these policies show a
moderate to no effect of such restrictions.
Several major studies have shown that
smoking restrictions do have a small nega-
tive effect on smoking levels. Sung et al.
[7] suggest that from studies of theWestern
United States, which tend to have the great-
est restrictions on smoking, the negative
effect of such policies is significant, though
only marginal. They estimate the effect of
policy as a 5.8 percent decrease in con-
sumption in the short run.
With regard to the youth population,
Chaloupka and Grossman [8] find that for
stringent restrictions, such as those that
include prohibition of smoking in private
workplaces and restaurants, there is a mod-
erately negative effect of these policies on
probability of smoking. However, they
show little or no effect on cutting down on
quantity. Less stringent restrictions, such as
restricting use in only publicly owned
places, seem to provide little or no evi-
dence of an effect of these policies on both
decreasing the probability of smoking or a
decrease in the quantity of cigarettes
smoked. Considering just the most relevant
restriction to youth, i.e., prohibition of
smoking at school or school events, there
appears to be a significant statistic evincing
a moderate decrease in cigarette consump-
tion as a result of these restrictions.
Gruber [3] states that there is evi-
dence of a slight effectiveness of these
policies, such as from bans on smoking on
public transportation and restaurants.
However, one substantial finding from his
study is that the younger youth seem to
respond more to restrictive policies by cut-
ting back more of their cigarette consump-
tion. Lewitt et al. [5] and Emery et al., [4]
on the other hand, both detect no effect on
smoking as a result of bans on locale
smoking.
Econometric data for both youth
access restrictions and environmental
tobacco smoke restrictions afford ambigu-
ous results. Results vary on a continuum
from a moderate negative effect toward,
ironically, a marginal positive effect on
smoking. It is unclear whether restrictive
policies are an effective means to helping
youth stay away from cigarettes.
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
POLICIES
Information dissemination involves
the promotion and prohibition of promo-
tion of tobacco products. Institutions and
organizations opposed to the consumption
of cigarettes run anti-smoking campaigns,
but the tobacco industry and its cigarette
companies advertise and promote their
products. Anti-smoking campaigns most
often attempt to educate the public on var-
ious health issues that accompany smok-
ing. This, in effect, makes the consumer
more aware of all of the costs associated
with smoking. Cigarette advertising, on the
other hand, can create the image that smok-
ing is glamorous and fun or sophisticated
and sexy.This commonly used commercial
tactic strives to increase the perceived ben-
efits of smoking. Tobacco is one of the
most heavily advertised and promoted con-
sumer products in the nation, second only
to the automobile industry in the size of its
expenditures for advertising [5]. Limiting
tobacco advertising and promotion halts
the latter’s attempts at such. As part of the
tobacco settlement and the Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA), the tobacco
companies voluntarily subjected them-
selves to withdrawing all tobacco billboard
ads and the use of cartoon characters in
promotion to limit tobacco advertising
exposure to the youth population [9].
There is little consensus as to whether
tobacco advertising even works [10].
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tobacco campaigns work also provide lit-
tle agreement. Very little is published
about the effectiveness of such bans, espe-
cially since the MSA is relatively new,
negotiated in late 1998. There does, how-
ever, seem to be a slight skew in the avail-
able literature that such bans are effective
in discouraging teenage smoking. A study
from Lewit et al. [11] in the 1980s showed
some evidence that the ban on broadcast
advertising had a modest effect on teenage
smoking. A more recent publication from
Lewit et al. [5] also found that exposure to
pro-tobacco media created some positive
correlation with smoking in ninth graders.
We can infer from this discovery that with
a ban on pro-tobacco media, a slightly
negative correlation could be speculated
with regard to teenage smoking.
On the other end of the spectrum of
information dissemination policies are
anti-tobacco campaigns. Many anti-tobac-
co campaigns utilize the mass media in the
form of public service announcements and
commercials. Others rely on grassroots
types of activities to enlighten consumers
of the dangers of smoking such as through
education campaigns in schools.
Several decades ago, Lewit et al. [11]
found that a combination of both radio and
television messages of anti-smoking
decreased smoking rates; it seemed to be
most effective in its first year of existence
though. More recently, Lewit et al. [5]
impart paradoxically that anti-tobacco
media actually somewhat increases the
likelihood of smoking in youth. From such
results we can speculate that as the media
touts the same message repeatedly, its
effects decrease because people tend to
start ignoring them. It can even lead to the
creation of a “forbidden fruit” effect, caus-
ing the opposite of the intended effect of
such policies.
The evidence of more direct types of
anti-smoking information dissemination
efforts do provide more positive news of
these policies’efficacy. Such devices stray
from the use of mass media toward a more
personal message. These include programs
in schools that teach students in-depth
about the bad effects of smoking, warning
labels on the packs of cigarettes them-
selves, and community gathering events
such as the Great American Smoke Out.
Lewit et al. [5] cite that among the various
media focused policy interventions the
most effective in reducing smoking among
ninth-graders seems to be education in the
classroom. While statistically significant
in reducing smoking, the effect tends to be
unfortunately small. Meier and Licari [12]
investigated the effects of the 1966
imposed Surgeon’s General Warning
labels directly on packs of cigarettes. In its
first year, the label decreased tobacco con-
sumption by 1.65 packs per capita. In the
years subsequent to the warning label’s
initiation, the impact to reduce smoking
remained and does so still today.
Unfortunately, the impact becomes small-
er with time. Much in the same way that
media messages get ignored over time so
do warning messages on cigarette packs.
Overall, Chaloupka and Grossman [6]
looked at the effect of cigarette taxes espe-
cially earmarked for anti-tobacco uses.
Several states, such as California and
Massachusetts, have made this a mandatory
requisite of their tobacco taxation laws. The
majority of these monies go to anti-smoking
campaigns of either type mentioned above
in addition to research on the topic.
Research intends to provide the information
that is included in educational campaigns
and indirectly serves to provide anti-smok-
ing information. They discover that the use
of such monies do provide a negative, sta-
tistically significant, effect on both the par-
ticipation rate and quantity smoked in
youth. Because these funds are indistin-
guishable from any of the above mentioned
programs, the results of this study can be
used as in indication of the overall effec-
tiveness of anti-tobacco campaigns.
Evidence paints a more hopeful pic-
ture of the effectiveness of information
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sures. However, such evidence is not high-
ly voluminous and is limited in its sugges-
tion of great effectiveness. While informa-
tion dispersion policies may be somewhat
effective on initiation, but they are limited
in their effect and eventually diminish
over time.
ECONOMIC INCENTIVE POLICIES
When examined in juxtaposition to
the other two aforementioned types of
policies, certain advantages can be imme-
diately noticed. With regard to information
dissemination campaigns, price changes
make costs explicit, rather than relying on
the individual to incorporate the informa-
tion intended to influence a consumer’s
perception of discount rate or externalities.
The method of media campaigns and edu-
cation relies on three steps to discourage
smoking: the acceptance of information,
internally adjusting costs and benefits, and
then ultimately making the decision not to
smoke. Changing prices eliminates the
first two steps and immediately aids the
consumer in whether or not such increased
price is worth his or her consumption.
Despite the seemingly apparent
advantage that price alterations have in
eliciting a response in consumption, price
responsiveness ultimately determines
whether such policies are effective. Price
elasticity of demand tells us whether or not
a change in price on a pack of cigarettes
will actually cause individuals to cut back
on their consumption and by how much.
The term “price elasticity of demand” rep-
resents the responsiveness of demand to
changes in price. This is described mathe-
matically as a percent change in quantity
demanded over the percent change in price.
When seeking to change the price of
cigarette packs, there are two options: sup-
ply-side and demand-side. A less tradition-
al method to affecting prices is via the sup-
ply side. Currently, the government creates
pricesupportsfortobaccofarmersandinso
doing sets a floor that the price of tobacco
leaves cannot fall below. This effectively
raises the price of tobacco. Only a handful
of studies have been done on the supply-
side effects of price supports in affecting
price. Sumner and Alston [13] published
the first influential report on this topic.
They stated that the removal of such price
controls would decrease price by 3 percent
and increase sales by 1 percent in the
United States. A follow up study was con-
ducted by Zhang et al. [14], which con-
cluded that price support programs only
minimally affect the price of a pack of cig-
arettes on the whole.At the time of its pub-
lication, the tobacco price support program
increased the price of tobacco leaves by 36
cents per pound, which ultimately translat-
ed to a 1 cent increase in the price of a pack
of cigarettes.
Taxation is a demand-side technique
to increase the price of cigarettes. This is
by far the most often used method to affect
changes in price. From empirical data, tax-
ation also appears to be the most effective
policy in the cessation or prevention of
teenage smoking. In fact, virtually every
study cites taxation and price changes as
an effective means of smoking deterrence
in the youth population. Relative to other
policies, the metric results on the efficacy
of taxation prove to be the most robust
regression estimates.
By understanding the incidence of tax
on the consumer and the elasticity of
demand, we can control the degree by
which we increase prices and decrease the
amount of smoking. With regard to inci-
dence of tax, Barnett et al. [15] found that
the tobacco industry is a six-firm oligopoly
with a high degree of price coordination.
Their results show that for a $1 increase in
taxes, 50 cents to 75 cents is passed onto
the consumer, depending on the type of
tax. Others have shown that prices can
actually rise by more than the amount of
the tax because of a lack of a perfectly
competitive market [7, 16]. If we can accu-
rately estimate such incidence, we can
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increase takes incidence of tax into
account.
It is important to note that decreased
rates of smoking can take on two forms:
either a decrease in participation rates (i.e.,
you smoke or you do not) or a decreased
quantity of cigarettes smoked (i.e., a
decreased frequency of smoking). Most
public health officials aim to only decrease
prevalence rates and dismiss the worth of
the latter. However, the benefit of a
decreased quantity smoked has just as
important of an effect. Fewer cigarettes
smoked still produce the same effects of
full cessation. For example, smoking less
still decreases the environmental damage of
smoke and reduces some health costs.
Thus, we consider either effect in response
to a price increase to be a successful policy.
Within the youth population, empiri-
cal data provide strong evidence of signif-
icant price sensitivity. While most studies
describe the decrease in teen smoking as
very significant, there are debates about
where the reductions stem from, whether
they are from fewer kids smoking or kids
who are smoking less. Nevertheless, evi-
dence pointing to the effectiveness of
prices is very significant and real. Lewit et
al. [11] estimate youth elasticity as nearly
three times that of the adult population
using data from the 1960s and 1970s.
Their estimates declared that teen price
sensitivity was –1.44, i.e., for a 10 percent
increase in prices, 14.4 percent of teens
reduce smoking, with results affecting a
youth’s decision to smoke rather than the
conditional demand of how many ciga-
rettes to smoke. With more recent data,
Chaloupka and Grossman [8] estimate that
the average overall youth elasticity of
demand is –1.313. This figure is statisti-
cally significant and again shows a sharp
reduction in smoking for increases in
price. In this study, however, the reduc-
tions in smoking come about equally from
a decline in participation and a cut back on
the quantity smoked per smoker. This
study concludes that because virtually no
smokers begin their habit after 20 years of
age, that large sustained increases in taxes
should be very effective in achieving long-
run improvements in health. Certainly, this
speculation seems valid, but only under
the assumption of constant elasticities.
There is some evidence that price
elasticities of demand change over time.
Speculations state that as taxes increase
they become less effective because the
only smokers left are the hard-core, die-
hard smokers who will not quit. Certainly
the shift in cultural and social climates
with regard to smoking may create
decreasing numbers of smokers to the
point where only the hard-core individuals
remain as well. Sheu et al. [17] realized
that in a study in California, in the context
of post-Proposition 10 and the tobacco set-
tlement, prices became less effective in a
state where smokers have been bombarded
with more and more costs to tobacco use.
While prices become less effective in get-
ting individuals to stop smoking, there
remains evidence of effectiveness on
decreasing the quantity smoked. Looking
over the youth data over time, however,
there seems to be no clear-cut evidence
showing changes in youth elasticity over
time. We associate time increases with
increasingly stringent smoking policies
and increased taxes in the case of the
United States. This lack of lessened effec-
tiveness of youth taxation can be simply
explained as growing pains. As the smok-
ing youth population becomes the older,
high-quantity chronic smoker, they no
longer belong to the cohort of youth; that
is, as individuals get hooked onto smoking
they grow beyond the age of what is clas-
sified as youth. Therefore, it remains that
the youth population can be likened to the
starting generation of smokers, and smok-
ing can continue to be stopped at its source
through continued taxation.
While taxation works to stop those
youth who actually purchase the cigarettes,
price changes might not have as big an
42 Ding: Curbing adolescent smokingeffect on those who are experimenting with
smoking. The economic incentives are not
as solid without actual purchases or very
small volumes thereof. Gruber [3] shows
that in a sample mean of various surveys
for high school seniors, the price elasticity
of the most robust data shows –0.67, only
–0.06 of that in quantity demanded. The
price elasticities of demand for high school
seniors from another survey show a
remarkable –3.0, –1.5 in participation and
–1.5 in quantity demanded of price elastic-
ity. But when surveying younger youth the
effectiveness of taxation seem inept. The
more robust of the data show a price elas-
ticity of only –0.31, with conditional
demand of –0.03. For the rest of the survey
data sets, a statistically insignificant esti-
mate was obtained. This suggests that the
younger youth, which are more likely just
starting to smoke, smoke cigarettes on an
experimental basis or to such a small extent
that purchasing cigarettes is not necessari-
ly a part of smoking. Perhaps these chil-
dren obtain cigarettes off older friends or
only smoke when offered cigarettes for
free. Emery et al. [4] conducted research
on differences between these sub-cohorts
of youth smokers. They were classified as
experimenters, who had tried cigarettes or
experimented to the extent of a few puffs,
current smokers, who had smoked a ciga-
rette in the last month, and established
smokers, who had smoked a cigarette in
the last month and smoked at least 100 cig-
arettes in their lifetime. Their results show
that for current smokers the price elasticity
stands at –1.70, –0.83 in participation and
–0.87 in quantity demanded; for estab-
lished smokers the price elasticity was
–2.24, –1.56 in participation and –0.68 in
quantity demanded. However, price was
not a factor for experimenters in any age
group. Therefore, we can set up these fig-
ures on a spectrum of those who do not
purchase cigarettes but smoke, those who
smoke regularly and purchase a medium
amount of cigarettes, and those who smoke
habitually and spend a large amount of
their budget on cigarettes. It is clear to see
that as intensity of smoking increases and
as a greater percentage of their allowances
and spending money is allocated toward
tobacco, the more effective taxation is on
creating incentives to cease such behavior.
One very interesting article authored
by Lewit et al. [5] provides some insight
into differences between boys and girls
when it comes to price sensitivity. Boys
show a much greater decrease in smoking
participation in response to an increase in
price than girls. Elasticities for boys range
from –1.51 to –1.02, whereas girls’ are
–0.32 to –0.06, for a combined –0.87 to
–0.49. On the other hand, girls show a
much greater response to an increase in
price for intent to smoke. Boys’ intent to
smoke were –0.92 to –0.84, and girls
–1.26 to –0.99, for a combined –1.07 to
–0.95. This concludes that while increases
in price are effective in reducing the youth
smoking rate, for boys, increased taxes are
more likely to cause them to stop smoking,
whereas in girls the effect seems to deter
them from starting in the first place. It is
interesting just to note how a policy
intended on performing a single function
can do it via multiple paths in different
segments of the population.
From the large quantity of literature
on price elasticities of cigarette demand, it
is quite reasonable to conclude that
increases in price affect teen smoking to a
great degree. Most estimates show that for
a 10 percent increase in prices, which
could be implemented by a tax of a third of
a dollar to each pack, a 15 percent
decrease in cigarettes consumed could be
very plausible. One unclear area that needs
further evaluation, however, is the experi-
mentation phase. At this early stage of
smoking, teens are not aware of the risks
of addiction and cannot be effectively pre-
vented from doing so with simple taxation.
Nevertheless, the benefits of using a sim-
ple, virtually costless tool such as taxation
proves to be quite large; the returns are
unmatched.
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